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ABSTRACT
Two retailers operate in a monopsonistic, oligopolistic environment. They have
to buy from spatially dispersed suppliers and use uniform pricing downstream. We
characterize prices and location in the two-stage location-then-price game under
two di¤erent pricing policies in the upstream market: uniform pricing and spatial
price discrimination. We analyze how local supply conditions a¤ect equilibrium
locations and pro…ts. We show that if retailers can choose a price policy initially
they commit to uniform pricing in the upstream market.
KEYWORDS: Spatial Competition; Intermediation; Uniform Pricing, Spatial
Price Discrimination
21. Introduction
It is well known that the location of retailers in space depends on the location of
consumers. In a model of price competition retailers have an incentive to relax
price competition by moving apart. However, the further they move away from
each other the larger the distance becomes to its consumers which in e¤ect makes
retailers not to di¤erentiate themselves too much in location. This lesson has
been learned by the classic paper by D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979)
which also applies to retailers (such as the ice-cream vendor on the beach).
In this paper, we concentrate on supply conditions. In order to reach con-
sumers, the product has to be shipped from the manufacturer to the retailer and
from the retailer to the consumer. We postulate that supply is competitive for
each retailer so that each retailer is a monopsonist upstream, that is, retailers
make take-it or leave-it o¤ers to their suppliers. We distinguish between uniform
pricing, according to which retailers o¤er the same wholesale price to all of its
potential suppliers, and spatial price discrimination, according to which each re-
tailer can make targeted take-it or leave-it o¤ers. Manufacturers are assumed to
have constant and identical marginal costs of production so that the transporta-
tion cost to ship the good from the manufacturer to its retailer’s store is the only
e¤ective di¤erence between manufacturers of one retailer. This translates into an
increase in the marginal costs of a retailer when increasing supply and in e¤ect
relaxes price competition between retailers. Note that the retailer’s marginal cost
would be constant in a model in which the transportation costs for shipments
between manufacturer and retailer are zero.
Supply functions for each retailer depend on the pricing policy and the dis-
tribution of manufacturers. First, we consider a localized but non-constrained
version of supply according to which the manufacturers of a retailer are uniformly
distributed around the retailers’ locations. Second, we consider a localized and
constrained version according to which manufacturers are located according to
the same distribution function as consumers (because, for example, consumers
are also producers). We analyze in which way locational constraints on supply
a¤ect equilibrium prices and locations (under uniform pricing and spatial price
discrimination).1
One may see the pricing behavior of retailers as part of the market environ-
ment which is exogenous. To this respect we ask in which way di¤erent market
environments a¤ect the pricing and location of retailers and contrast uniform
pricing with spatial price discrimination in the upstream market. We then make
the choice of price policy endogenous and show that retailers commit to uniform
1In this idealized environment we ignore the possibility to open more than one store (for this
see Champsaur and Rochet, 1989, under constant marginal costs for retailers).
3pricing in the upstream market although this is more costly.
In our model we have to take rationing into account. Since an increase in
supply is costly for retailers, there exist price combinations in which consumers
are rationed. Clearly, rationing is never a best response. We make the assumption
on consumer behavior that they choose their favorite retailer discarding the pos-
sibility of rationing. Since rationing does not occur in equilibrium, these bounded
rational consumers obtain as much utility as consumers who were aware of the
possibility of rationing.
Although our model should be seen as an abstract framework to address the
impact of local supply and pricing policies, it seems to us that it captures an im-
portant aspect of the locational choice of retailers. As an example, one can think
of markets for agricultural goods where there are a many farmers and consumers
allocated in a same geographical space (although according to di¤erent distribu-
tion functions). Farmers sell their harvest to a few shops and these shops sell the
product to consumers. Another example could be markets for used cars and other
second-hand durable goods in a geographical area. Owners of …rst-hand cars want
to sell their product but need a dealer who certi…es the quality of the product.
The dealer then sells the second-hand cars to consumers.
There exist many reasons why manufacturers and consumers do need inter-
mediaries to sell and buy goods (see Spulber, 1999). It is not the purpose of this
paper to model these reasons, we rather take it as given that manufacturers can-
not sell directly to consumers. In contrast to most of the literature on vertically
related markets (see, for instance, Tirole, 1988) we give all the market power to
the retailer; that is, they are monopsonists upstream and compete as oligopolists
downstream. Suppliers and consumers take prices or price schedules as given.
This is motivated by evidence that in many manufacturer-retailer relationships
market power mainly rests with the retailer.
Our paper relates to the literature inspired by Hotelling (1929) in which the
main aim was to explain market power under price competition which arises from
the use of di¤erentiation strategies. The endogenous choice of location, which
determines the degree of product di¤erentiation under horizontal di¤erentiation,
has received a lot of attention (see e.g. D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse,
1979, de Palma et al., 1985, Economides, 1986, Böckem, 1994, Bester, 1998). Our
paper shows that under uniform pricing supply conditions a¤ect the incentives
to horizontally di¤erentiate. In particular, more localized supply leads to higher
pro…ts even though …rms locate closer to each other. This is due to more localized
supply generating higher marginal costs thus making retailers less aggressive.
Di¤erent pricing policies, and in particular spatial price discrimination, have
been an important research topic in the Hotelling framework (see Greenhut and
Greenhut, 1975, Spulber, 1981, Norman, 1983, Lederer and Hurter, 1986). Natu-
4ral questions to ask are (1) whether uniform pricing performs better than spatial
price discrimination and (2) whether …rms have an incentive to commit to uni-
form pricing (see Thisse and Vives, 1988, de Fraja and Norman, 1993, Norman and
Thisse, 1996, Eber, 1997, Aguirre, Espinosa, and Macho-Stadler, 1998, Tabuchi,
1999). These papers only consider transactions between retailers and consumers
and thus price discrimination in the downstream market whereas our focus is on
the pricing policies in the upstream market. In our model, retailers can follow
di¤erent pricing policies upstream. In the downstream market, retailers use uni-
form pricing. In contrast to models in which …rms follow di¤erent price policies
in the downstream market (see, for instance, Thisse and Vives, 1988), we obtain
pure-strategy equilibria at the stage where prices are chosen simultaneously after
…rms have committed to di¤erent pricing policies in the upstream market. Hence,
we do not need to impose a leader-follower assumption at the price setting stage
when …rms use di¤erent price policies.
Thisse and Vives (1988) show that …rms use spatial price discrimination rather
than uniform pricing downstream. This result holds in the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the three-stage game in which …rms …rst choose location, second
commit to a price policy, and third set prices and in which competition is modeled
according to the quadratic Hotelling model with constant marginal costs (see Eber,
1997). However, Eber (1997) has also shown that this result depends on the order
of moves, namely, if stages 1 and 2 are reversed …rms commit to uniform pricing.
Taking this alternative order of moves we show that the strategic advantage of
uniform pricing dominates the cost disadvantage so that both …rms commit to
uniform pricing in the upstream market at the …rst stage of the game. We …nd
that our result does not depend on whether …rms …rst commit to price policies or
choose locations.
Also, we would like to point out that in contrast to most papers in the Hotelling
tradition we allow for …rms to locate outside the area in which consumers “live”.
That is, we do not want to rule out that retailers locate outside town. This
generates more di¤erentiation possibilities for retailers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Subsection 2.1 the basic model is pre-
sented under uniform pricing, and in the Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 the model is
solved under two di¤erent assumptions on the locations of manufacturers. In
Section 3 di¤erent price policies are analyzed. Section 3.1 compares price dis-
crimination to uniform pricing in the upstream market. Section 3.2 examines the
strategic choice of price policies. Section 4 concludes.
52. Uniform Pricing
2.1. Model and Benchmark
In this section we present the model under uniform mill pricing. This means
that retailer i charges the same mill price pi to the consumers independent of
their location; the full price a consumer pays is equal to the mill price plus the
transportation cost. Retailers pay a uniform price !i to suppliers who have to bear
the transportation cost to the retailer. Note that di¤erent transportation costs
will be analyzed to capture possible di¤erences in costs to ship the product from
the producer to the retailer and from the retailer to the consumers. We assume
that transportation costs are quadratic. The transportation cost for a consumer
located at x buying at a retailer located at li is t1(li ¡ x)2. Correspondingly, a
manufacturer has to pay transportation cost t2(li ¡ x)2.
Consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit interval, x 2 [0;1] and each
consumer has a reservation price r for the good at the ideal location x. We will
implicitly assume that r is su¢ciently high such that, in equilibrium, all consumers
want to buy from one of the retailers, that is, the market is covered. A consumer
will buy from retailer A if his net utility is larger than the net utility to buy from
retailer B,t h a ti s ,
r ¡ pA ¡ t1(lA ¡ x)
2 ¸ r ¡ pB ¡ t1(lB ¡ x)
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Possibly, supply is insu¢cient to cover demand. In this case we assume that
rationed consumers cannot switch to the competitor, that is, a consumer who
cannot buy from his preferred retailer does not buy at all. In our locational
model this can be motivated by saying that consumers always buy from their
preferred retailer independent of the risk to be rationed. They make the journey
to one of them and are constrained not to go to the other in case the good was
not available at the location they tried …rst. Note that rationing of consumers
does not occur in equilibrium.2
2For a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with di¤erentiated products see for instance Canoy (1996).
– Our assumptions on consumer demand can be rationalized for certain parameter constellations
of the model. To do so, an essential assumption would be that the marginal consumer who is
indi¤erent between the two retailers is never rationed.
6Since manufacturers do not enjoy market power, they take the price !i as
given. Pro…ts of manufacturer located at x which produces for retailer i are
¼x;i(!i;l i)=!i ¡ t2(li ¡ x)
2 ¡ c, x 2 R, i = A;B:
We assume that manufacturers for each retailer i are uniformly distributed over a
compact subset of the reals. In order to restrict the number of parameters of the
model, we assume furthermore that the density of the manufacturers’ location is
1. A manufacturer at location x is willing to produce and sell to retailer i if
!i ¡ t2(li ¡ x)
2 ¡ c ¸ 0:
This participation constraint translates into a supply function for retailer i,
denoted by qS
i (!i;l i). Its particular form depends on the distribution of man-
ufacturers. We will consider two cases of manufacturer locations. In the …rst
case they are distributed uniformly on an interval which includes any relevant
area for a given retailer location li, that is, there are always producers on both
sides of any relevant location of retailer i, and we can assume that the interval is
Xi(li)=[ li ¡ 1=2;l i +1 =2]. In the second case manufacturers are distributed in
t h es a m ea r e aa sc o n s u m e r s ,t h a ti sx 2 [0;1].
We can write the pro…t function of retailer i as
¼
0
i(pA;p B;! i;l A;l B)=pi minfq
D





Clearly, given locations lA;l B t h eb e s tr e s p o n s eo fr e t a i l e ri to prices pj;!j are
prices pi;! i such that qD
i (pA;p B;lA;l B)=qS
i (!i;l i). This implicitly de…nes a func-
tion e !i(pA;p B;lA;l B). Hence, along their best response at the price competition
stage we can write retailer i’s pro…ts as
¼i(pA;p B;l A;l B)=( pi ¡ e !i(pA;p B;lA;l B))q
D
i (pA;p B;lA;l B): (2.2)
As a …rst benchmark consider the standard Hotelling model as presented by
D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). In our model this corresponds to
the case t2 =0 . In this section we do not impose any restriction on the locational
choice of retailers, so they may locate outside the support of the distribution of
consumers’ locations. In this case retailers locate at ¡1=4 and 5=4 in unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium (in pure strategies). Retailers make equilibrium pro…ts
(3=4)t1. The fact that retailers locate outside the [0;1]-interval is an artifact of
the assumption of a uniform distribution; for other distributions retailers would
locate within the support of the distribution of consumers’ locations. If retailers
were restricted to locate in the [0;1]-interval, they would choose locations at 0
and 1 respectively, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and
obtain pro…ts (1=2)t1.
72.2. Localized, but unconstrained supply
Consumers are uniformly distributed over [0;1], and manufacturers of retailer i
are uniformly distributed over the compact interval Xi(li).A m a n u f a c t u r e r o f
retailer i supplies its product if !i¡t2(li¡x)2¡c ¸ 0. Hence, supply is provided












Since manufacturers are uniformly distributed on any interval in the neighborhood









































In any best response, retailer i sets its wholesale price !i such that qD
i (pA;p B;lA;l B)=
qS
i (!i;l i). This gives wholesale prices











Substituting the expressions from equations (2.1) and (2.3) we obtain pro…t func-
tions (2.2) as a function depending on the variables pA;p B;l A;l B and the param-
eters of the model. Necessary conditions for an (interior) equilibrium in the price




The solution to the system of …rst-order conditions de…nes retail prices p¤
i(lA;l B).
Substituting these prices into the pro…t functions ¼i, gives continuation pro…t
functions e ¼i(lA;l B) ´ ¼i(p¤
A(lA;l B);p ¤
B(lA;l B);lA;l B).D e n o t e ® ´ t2=t1.N o t e
that in the standard Hotelling model ® =0 .I f® =1then consumers and manu-
facturers use the same transportation technology. We refer to a unique equilibrium
if there exists only one equilibrium (in pure strategies) with lA <l B.W e t h e n
have the following characterization of equilibrium locations, prices and pro…ts.
Proposition 1. In the model with uniform pricing upstream and downstream
and with manufacturers’ locations uniformly distributed around retailers’ loca-
tions with density 1, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the















3(24 + ®)(8 + 3®)
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24 + ® +
q
3(24 + ®)(8 + 3®)
¶
t1, i = A;B:
We can now compare the locational choice in the presence of uniform pricing
and positive transportation costs to the initial benchmark in which t2 =0.I n
the standard model of product di¤erentiation the two retailers take two contrary
e¤ects into account:
² d e m a n de ¤ e c t :a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hs h o p sa r ew i l l i n gt ol o c a t ec l o s et ot h eg e -
ographical center (hence, also close to each other) in order to obtain greater
demand.
² strategic e¤ect: according to which shops are willing to separate from each
other in order to relax price competition.
The balancing of these two e¤ects determines where retailers locate. Ignoring
the strategic e¤ect, locations remain una¤ected for t2 > 0 because the supply con-
ditions do not depend on the retailers’ locations. However, it is costly to increase
supply because all manufacturers have to be paid more. Hence, retailers compete
less aggressively in prices on the product market, supporting higher pro…ts for
given locations than in the standard model with t2 =0 . Also, since locating fur-
ther away from the center is punished less severely by the competing retailer, thus
in‡icting fewer losses on demand, retailers have a stronger tendency to move apart
from each other. In equilibrium, both …rms locate further apart, as summarized
by the following remark.




A=@t2 =( 1 =t1)@l
¤
A=@® < 0 and @l
¤
B=@t2 =( 1 =t1)@l
¤
B=@® > 0:
For comparisons, we are particularly interested in the case t1 = t2. Then the
equilibrium characterization of Proposition 1 becomes
!
¤¤
i = c +
t2
16
¼ c +0 :06t2
p
¤¤


















i ¼ 0:84t2 (2.4)
2.3. Localized and constrained supply
In this subsection both, consumers and manufacturers, are located on the interval
x 2 [0;1]. F o rag o o dt ob es u p p l i e dt or e t a i l e ri by a manufacturer at x one
must have !i ¡ t2(li ¡ x)2 ¡ c ¸ 0, as before. A retailer which moves away from
the [0;1]-interval not only has the disadvantage of decreasing the utility of the
good for the consumers but in the present setup, in addition, incurs higher costs
because it is more costly to ship the good from the manufacturers to the retailer
and the retailer pays the transportation cost of the marginal manufacturer to all
manufacturers. Note that if !A ¡t2(lA)2 ¡c>0, the manufacturer at x =0sells
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Following the reasoning in the previous subsection we can characterize the unique
equilibrium of the two-stage game.
Proposition 2. In the model with uniform pricing upstream and downstream
and with manufacturers’ locations x 2 [0;1], there exists a unique subgame per-
fect equilibrium in the location-then-price stage. For t1 = t2, equilibrium prices,
locations and pro…ts are
!
¤¤
i ¼ c +0 :36t2, i = A;B,
p
¤¤


















i ¼ 0:91t2, i = A;B: (2.5)
The more complicated characterization for t1 6= t2 is relegated to Appendix 1.
Comparing characterizations (2.4) and (2.5) we make the following observations.
If supply is constrained to the unit interval, …rms locate closer to each other than
in the unconstrained case. This is not surprising since locating apart is far more
costly. In spite of this closer location, wholesale prices are much higher than in
the unconstrained case. Note that already at lA =0equilibrium wholesale prices
10in the constrained case are more than twice the prices in the unconstrained case
because transportation costs are convex.
Price-average cost margins are higher in the constrained case although retail-
ers’ unit costs, which are equal to wholesale prices, are higher. This is explained
by the following two facts: …rst, both retailers are less aggressive competitors at
the pricing stage due to higher marginal costs which retailers have to incur in
order to obtain additional supply; and second, the gap between marginal costs
and average costs widens. Higher price-average cost margins translate into higher
pro…ts.
3. Price policies in the Upstream Market
3.1. Price Discrimination in the Upstream Market
In this section we compare our previous results with the results under spatial price
discrimination in the upstream market. In this subsection we consider the retail-
ers’ pricing under the hypothesis that they set uniform prices downstream and
price discriminate upstream. As in the previous section, we consider two variants
of the model, the …rst in which manufacturers are located around the retailers’
locations such that retailers do not face supply constraints in any direction, and
t h es e c o n di nw h i c hm a n u f a c t u r e r sa r el o c a t e do nt h e[0;1]-interval. Each man-
ufacturer is supposed to bear the transportation cost and is o¤ered a price !i(x)
which may depend on its location. We might as well let retailers bear the trans-
portation cost upstream. In this latter case manufacturers would only receive the
payment c. As in the previous section, we consider the uniform distribution of
manufacturers around any retailers’ locations, that is, on Xi(li) and the restricted
version in which manufacturers are distributed uniformly on [0;1].
Unconstrained supply. Manufacturers are assumed to be uniformly distributed
around any retailers’ locations, as it has been assumed in Subsection 2.2. The
di¤erence between price discrimination and uniform pricing upstream is that under
uniform pricing retailers incur higher costs on average and in the margin because
an increase in supply not only raises the price paid for the last unit but also
for all inframarginal units. This suggests that price discrimination upstream is
bene…cial from a monopoly perspective but may reduce equilibrium pro…ts in
oligopoly because retailers become more aggressive.













[c + t2(lB ¡ x)
2]dx:




i (pA;p B;lA;l B) ¡ Ci(pA;p B;lA;l B);
and we obtain unique solutions p¤
i(lA;l B). Substituting these prices we obtain re-
duced pro…t functions which only depend on location lA and lB. We fully charac-
terize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium with price discrimination upstream
by the following proposition (recall that t2 = ®t1).
Proposition 3. In the model with uniform pricing upstream and downstream
and with manufacturers’ locations uniformly distributed around retailers’ loca-
tions with density 1, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the
location-then-price stage. Equilibrium prices, locations and pro…ts are
p
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¶
t1, i = A;B:
Comparing Propositions 1 and 3, we observe that given any ® and t1 equilib-
rium pro…ts are greater under uniform pricing than under price discrimination.
Furthermore, retailers locate further apart under uniform pricing than under price
discrimination. In the case t1 = t2, the equilibrium characterization of Proposition
3r e a d s
p
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Compared to the benchmark with t2 =0 , price competition is relaxed due to
higher marginal costs. Compared to uniform pricing retailers price more aggres-
sively and this a¤ects equilibrium locations. We observe more di¤erentiation be-
tween retailers than in the benchmark and less di¤erentiation than under uniform
pricing.
Constrained supply. Suppose that manufacturers of each retailer are uniformly











[c + t2(lB ¡ x)
2]dx
12f o rl o c a t i o n sa n dd e m a n ds u c ht h a tr e t a i l e rA has an incentive to buy from the
manufacturer located at 0 and retailer B from the manufacturer located at 1.
As in Subsection 2.3 we provide the equilibrium characterization for symmetric
transportation costs, that is, t2 = t1.
Proposition 4. In the model with uniform pricing upstream and downstream
and with manufacturers’ locations x 2 [0;1], there exists a unique subgame per-
fect equilibrium in the location-then-price stage. For t1 = t2, equilibrium prices,
locations and pro…ts are
p
¤¤
i = c +
39
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t2 ¼ 0:71t2, i = A;B:
Compared to the equilibrium in the unconstrained case we observe that re-
tailers di¤erentiate less and obtain lower pro…ts. Note that pro…ts are lower in
the constrained than in the unconstrained case. This is in contrast to the our
previous result under uniform pricing where pro…ts are higher in the restricted
case. Consequently, a change of supply conditions has di¤erent e¤ects under price
discrimination than under uniform pricing. This can be explained by the fact that
changes in the supply conditions have a di¤erent impact on the marginal costs
under the two pricing policies.
Compared to the equilibrium under uniform pricing as characterized by equa-
tions (2.5) we observe that equilibrium locations are only slightly a¤ected. Retail-
ers sell closer substitutes under price discrimination than under uniform pricing.
There exist several forces which make …rms change their location. Each retailer
has an incentive to di¤erentiate itself under price discrimination because this re-
laxes price competition. The costs which are associated with moving apart are
lower under price discrimination than under uniform pricing. However, since the
competitor prices more aggressively in the downstream market under price dis-
crimination upstream, a relocation in order to relax price competition is more
damaging in terms of pro…ts. Clearly, for …xed locations retailers make lower
pro…ts under price discrimination than under uniform pricing. This e¤ect is rein-
forced by the locational choice of the two retailers.
I nt h ea s y m m e t r i cc a s et1 6= t2 we obtain locations lA = ¡1=(4 + ® + ®2) and
lB =1¡ lA. The higher are the transportation costs in the upstream market
relative to the cost in the downstream market, the closer the two retailers move
to each other. For any t1, t2 retailer A locates between 0 and ¡1=4.I nA p p e n d i x
2 we report equilibrium prices p¤
i(lA;l B) and continuation pro…ts ¼¤
i(lA;l B).
133.2. Choice of Price Policies in the Upstream Market
In this subsection we will explain what happens if a retailer can commit to its
price policy before choosing locations. Throughout this subsection we assume
that manufacturers and consumers are distributed uniformly on [0;1].3 Consider
…rst the case where the retailers have to locate in the [0;1]-interval. In this case
for any combination of price policies it is optimal to maximally di¤erentiate on
the set of admissible locations. We consider the following three stage game:
Stage 1: Retailers choose their price policy upstream.
Stage 2: Retailers choose the location of their shop on the [0;1]-interval.
Stage 3: Retailers set simultaneously a uniform price downstream and prices
upstream subject to their restriction on price policies.
Which price policy is superior? Note that uniforms pricing leads to higher av-
erage costs for the retailer, given some quantity to be supplied. Hence, one might
expect that uniform pricing performs worse than price discrimination upstream.
Clearly, price discrimination wins against uniform pricing for retailer locations in
[0;1] if retailers have chosen di¤erent price policies. However, the price discrim-
inating retailer is more aggressive because its marginal costs are lower than the
marginal costs for the retailer with uniform pricing. In our model, retailers are
much more aggressive when price discriminating with the consequence that both
gain if one of them commits to uniform pricing (although clearly the one which
does not commit to uniform pricing upstream gains more than its competitor).
This is a situation in which the strategic e¤ect dominates the cost e¤ect.
Lemma 1. Assuming that t1 = t2, retailers make the following pro…ts in subgame
perfect equilibrium of the subgame following stage 1 (UP stands for uniform pric-




















At the location stage with di¤erent price policies, we …nd @e ¼A(lA;1)=@lA < 0
and @e ¼B(0;l B)=@lB > 0, that is both …rms gain by moving apart. Note that the
3We have checked our qualitative results for the unconstrained case. In particular, it can be
shown that also in this case retailers commit to uniform pricing upstream.
14commitment to uniform pricing strictly dominates price discrimination at stage 1
when considering pro…ts in subgame perfect equilibrium of the subgame following
stage 1. Hence, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. Assuming that t1 = t2, there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the above three-stage game with lA;l B 2 [0;1]. In equilibrium, both
retailers commit to uniform pricing in the upstream market, that is the strategic
e¤ect which makes the retailer less aggressive dominates the negative cost e¤ect
due to uniform pricing.
Remark 2. Our result on the choice of price policy is robust to the reversal of
stages 1 and 2. Note in particular that in the neighborhood of (lA;l B)=( 0 ;1)
both retailers choose uniform pricing in the subgame which follows the locational
choice at stage 1.4
In what follows, we allow both retailers to locate outside the unit interval.
That is, we analyze the three-stage game from above with the modi…cation that
the strategy space for both retailers at stage 1 are the reals. The subgames in
which both retailers adopt the same price policies have been analyzed in Subsec-
tion 2.3 and Subsection 3.1. We have observed that both retailers obtain higher
pro…ts under uniform pricing than under price discrimination due to the strategic
e¤ect. As above, we investigate whether it is an equilibrium outcome that both
retailers commit themselves not to price discriminate at stage 1. For this, we
have to reconsider the asymmetric choices of price policies. As explained above,
the retailer with uniform pricing upstream is less aggressive than the competitor.
This a¤ects the locational decisions of the retailers. Suppose retailer A does not
price discriminate. For symmetric locations both, none or one of the retailers has
an incentive to deviate from these locations by moving closer to the competitor.
If exactly one retailer has such an incentive it is always the retailer with uniform
pricing, that is, the less aggressive price setter in the downstream market.
In the asymmetric case expressions become too complicated to solve for equi-
librium locations algebraically. However, there exists a unique price equilibrium
for each pair of locations we obtain explicit expressions for equilibrium prices
p¤
i(lA;l B). At the location stage, we obtain the equilibrium candidates by …nding
the zeros of the system of two …rst-order conditions which follow from maximiz-
ing continuation pro…ts e ¼i(lA;l B) with respect to li. We tried many parameter
constellations t1, t2 and always obtained a unique admissible solution, and this
solution is a global maximizer.
4As mentioned in the introduction, Eber (1997) pointed out that the equilibrium choice of
price policy downstream depends on the order of stages 1 and 2. (His model corresponds to our
model with t2 =0 .)
15Lemma 2. Assuming that t1 = t2 =1 , retailers make the following pro…ts in













Note that under symmetric costs, t1 = t2, equilibrium locations are indepen-
dent of the scaling parameter of the transportation costs and the pro…t ranking
generalizes to any symmetric case. Surprisingly, in the o¤-diagonal entries the
retailer with uniform pricing obtains higher pro…ts than the retailer with price
discrimination so that the pro…t ordering is reversed compared to the case where
both retailers locate in the [0;1]-interval. Also, the retailer with uniform pricing,
say retailer A, locates in the interior of the interval. It might surprise that retailer
A locates in the interior of the support of the consumer density whereas it locates
on its boundary when retailers where restricted to locate in [0;1]. Consider the
initial situation (lA;l B)=( 0 ;1). Note that argmaxlA e ¼A(lA;1) ¼¡ 0:044 and
argmaxlB e ¼B(0;l B) ¼ 1:200. The aggressive retailer B gains from committing
to price less aggressively by locating further apart. This also holds for retailer
A, but its optimal deviation is much less than the optimal deviation of retailer
B. Recall that retailer A’s costs are very sensitively to reaching out to suppliers
which are further away. Retailer A has therefore a stronger incentive to locate
inside the support of the density function according to which manufacturers are
distributed. This explains why it happens that, in equilibrium, retailer A locates
in the interior of the unit interval for t1 = t2. Also, it is retailer A who mainly
bene…ts from these new locations compared to (0;1). Its increase in pro…ts is so
strong that the pro…t ordering between the two retailers is reversed. We obtain
that uniform pricing is chosen in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the
three stage game.
Proposition 6. Assuming that t1 = t2, there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the above three-stage game with lA;l B 2< . In equilibrium, both
retailers commit to uniform pricing in the upstream market.
Our remark on the robustness to the order of stages 1 and 2 also applies
here. The above result also holds for asymmetric transportation costs t1 6= t2,a s
we have checked for di¤erent parameter constellations. Clearly, with asymmet-
ric transportation costs equilibrium locations and pro…ts in the subgame which
follows stage 1 are di¤erent from the ones reported in Lemma 2 above. In the
16case of di¤erent price policies retailer A does not necessarily locate in the interior
of the unit interval. Also, for certain other parameter constellations the distance
between the two retailers becomes less than 1.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a model of spatial competition in which two
retailers operate in a monopsonistic, oligopolistic environment. They have to buy
from spatially dispersed suppliers and use uniform pricing downstream.
First, we have characterized the equilibrium in the two-stage location-then-
price game under uniform pricing in the upstream market. We analyze how local
supply conditions a¤ect equilibrium locations and pro…ts. Compare the case in
which supply is only available from the area in which consumers are located to the
situation in which supply is available everywhere. In the …rst case average and
marginal costs of production are higher if a retailer is located outside the area
in which consumers are located. In equilibrium, retailers locate closer to each
other. In spite of locating closer to each other, their pro…ts are larger than in the
equilibrium with unconstrained supply. This is due the strategic e¤ect of higher
marginal costs at the pricing stage.
Second, we have analyzed spatial price discrimination in the upstream market
and the strategic choice of price policy. Given locations, costs for a given quantity
are signi…cantly less convex for a retailer under spatial price discrimination than
under uniform pricing. This makes retailers more aggressive at the price stage.
In equilibrium, retailers earn lower pro…ts under spatial price discrimination than
under uniform pricing. This holds although retailers enjoy lower total costs under
spatial price discrimination. In the setup in which retailers choose price policy
at an initial stage we have shown that retailers commit to uniform pricing in the
upstream market.
We have considered an environment in which a single retailer which enjoys
monopoly power on both sides of the market and has to use uniform pricing in
the downstream market would choose spatial price discrimination rather than
uniform pricing in the upstream market. We have shown that, in equilibrium, im-
perfect competition in the downstream market leads retailers to opt for uniform
pricing rather than spatial price discrimination in the upstream market. Imper-
fect competition reverses the result on the optimal price policy under monopoly
framework: uniform pricing strictly dominates price discrimination.. We expect
that our results on the choice of price policy also hold in an oligopoly framework
with localized competition such as the circular city (Salop, 1979, Economides,
1989).
A potential topic for future research might be to consider price policies as
17endogenous on both sides of the market. We would be very interested in such an
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